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Abstract
In the Constitution’s earliest days, members of the House engaged in one of the nation’s
most momentous constitutional debates. While deliberating on the Department of Foreign
Affairs bill, representatives considered the mechanisms for removing executive officers. The final
Act conveyed no removal authority but discussed what would happen when the president
removed the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The traditional view of the Decision, voiced by James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and William Howard Taft, is that because the Act conveyed no
removal authority and laid out what would happen when the president removed, the Act
presumed that the president had a preexisting constitutional power to remove executive officers.
But there has long been a revisionist view that the Decision did not decide any constitutional
question, certainly not in any definitive way. Citing a split in the House majority on a crucial
amendment, Louis Brandeis, Edward Corwin, and others have claimed that the majority
coalition that voted for the Foreign Affairs Act was deeply divided on constitutional principles.
In particular, revisionists have asserted that about half of the majority that approved the Foreign
Affairs bill rejected the view that the Constitution granted the president a removal power. Using
evidence recently made accessible, this article argues that the traditional reading of the Decision
is the correct one. A majority in the House and the Senate concluded that the Constitution’s
grant of executive power enabled the president to remove executive officers. Moreover, on two
subsequent departmental bills, majorities in the House and the Senate voted to reaffirm the view
that the executive power granted the president a removal power. The Decision of 1789 thus
stands as the first significant legislative construction of the Constitution and as an exemplary
episode when Congress approached its constitutional obligations with sophistication, sincerity,
and deliberation.
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New Light on the Decision of 1789
By Saikrishna Prakash*

America’s most famous constitutional law decisions—cases like Marbury, Brown,
and Roe—were all decided by judges.
Judicial decisions virtually monopolize
constitutional law casebooks and, one supposes, classroom discussions. Given the
content of casebooks and classroom discourse, the unwary student might wrongly infer
that determining the Constitution’s meaning involves little more than discerning what
judges have said about it and that other institutions inevitably look to the courts, never
making their own constitutional decisions.
Of course, judges have never enjoyed a monopoly on constitutional decision
making. In 1798, the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures resolved that the Alien and
Sedition Acts were unconstitutional.1 During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln decided
that the Constitution permitted him to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.2 And Harry
Truman concluded that he had the constitutional authority to seize steel mills to ensure
supplies for the Korean War.3 Obviously, one could cite many more examples.
Perhaps one of the most significant and yet unfamiliar and murky constitutional
law decisions is the “Decision of 1789.”4 In the earliest days of the Constitution, members
of the House engaged in one of the nation’s most exhaustive, erudite, and edifying
constitutional debates. While discussing the Department of Foreign Affairs bill,
representatives discussed how executive officers could be removed from office. Some
representatives claimed that the grant of executive power vested the president with a
power to remove executive officers (the “executive power theory”); others argued that
because the Senate’s consent was necessary to appoint, its consent was necessary to
remove (the “advice and consent theory”); a third group claimed that since the
Constitution did not expressly grant removal authority, Congress could vest a removal
power with the president (the “congressional delegation theory”); and finally, a handful of
*
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See The Kentucky and Virginia Resolves in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 131-36 (Phillip B.
Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 146-147, 170 (2003).
3
See Exec. Order 10,340, 16 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1952).
4
Apparently, this appellation for the 1789 decision of Congress regarding the removability of the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs has been used at least since 1835. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151
(1926) (quoting Daniel Webster’s speech of February, 1835).
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representatives asserted that impeachment was the only permissible means of removing
any officer of the United States (the “impeachment theory”). Even at the time, members
noted how important the issue was and that it would set a precedent for future cases.5
At the end of a debate that spanned over a month, Congress enacted nearly
identical text in three departmental acts.6 None of these acts conferred a removal power
upon the president.7 Rather, each discussed who would have custody of departmental
papers when the president removed a secretary.8 In the minds of many at the time and
since, the bills’ discussion of who would have custody of departmental papers upon
presidential removal of a secretary implied that the first Congress believed that the
Constitution granted the president a removal power.
Indeed, advocates of broad presidential power have consistently cited the Decision
of 1789 as revealing that the first Congress decided that the Constitution’s grant of
executive power empowered the president to remove executive officers. Alexander
Hamilton, writing as Pacificus in 1793, had no doubts that the first Congress had
endorsed the executive power theory.9 Chief Justice John Marshall, in his biography of
George Washington, claimed that the Decision “has ever been considered as a full
expression of the sense of the legislature” that the Constitution granted the executive
removal authority.10 William Howard Taft, the only Chief Justice to also have served as
Chief Executive, likewise read the Decision of 1789 in his comprehensive majority
opinion in Myers v. United States.11
Conversely, an impressive array of judges and scholars has long denied that there
really was a Decision of 1789, at least as Hamilton, Marshall, and Taft described it.
5

See, e.g., 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, 921 (1992)
(comments of James Madison) (noting that he felt “the importance of the question, and know that our
decision will involve the decision of all similar cases”).
6
Compare An Act for Establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of
Foreign Affairs, 1 Stat. 28, 29 § 2 (1789)(providing that the chief Clerk would have custody of all
departmental papers “whenever the principal Officer shall be removed from Office by the President of the
United States”) with An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, 1 Stat. 65, 67 § 7 (1789)(providing
that Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury would have custody of all departmental papers “whenever
the Secretary shall be removed from office by the President of the United States”) with An Act to Establish
an Executive Department, to be Denominated the Department of War, 1 Stat. 49, 50 §2 (1789)(providing
that inferior officer could have custody of all departmental papers “whenever the said principal officer shall
be removed from Office by the President of the United States”).
7
See supra note 5.
8
See supra note 5.
9
Pacificus No. 1, reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33-43 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,
1969).
10
JOHN MARSHALL, 5 The LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 200 (1807).
11
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115 (1926).
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Dissenting in Myers, Justice Louis Brandeis emphatically claimed that the “facts of the
record” do not warrant the conclusion that a House majority supported the executive
power theory.12 The final text of the Foreign Affairs Act that implied a constitutional
removal power “was due to a strategy of dividing the opposition and not to unanimity of
constitutional conceptions,” Brandeis insisted.13 In the aftermath of Myers, the renowned
constitutional scholar Edward Corwin built upon Brandeis’ assertions. Corwin claimed
that less than a third of the House actually favored the view that the president had a
constitutional removal power.14 More recently, well respected scholar David Currie made
a similar claim.15 In his exceptional book, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, Currie wrote that though a majority of the House favored
presidential removal, “there was no consensus as to whether [the president] got that
authority from Congress or from the Constitution itself.”16
As evidence for their claims, both Corwin and Currie cited a revealing vote on a
crucial amendment offered in the House.17 Though a majority of the House ultimately
voted for the final bill, this majority coalition first split on the key amendment.18 The
amendment sought to strike out a provision that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was “to
be removable from office by the president of the United States.”19 The amendment’s
sponsor, Representative Egbert Benson of New York, believed that a House majority
actually favored the executive power theory. Because the provision could be read as a
grant of removal authority and thus an endorsement of the congressional delegation
theory, Benson claimed that the House ought to delete it.20 Some of those who ultimately
voted for the House bill, such as James Madison, first voted for Benson’s crucial
12

Myers, 272 U.S. 285 n.75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Somewhat contradictorily, Brandeis earlier
admitted that the Decision of 1789 decided that the president had a constitutional power of removal, at
least in the absence of legislative limitation. See id. at 284.
13
Id. at 285 n.75. As Brandeis points out, he was not the first to deny that there was majority House
support for the executive power theory. Brandeis notes that Justice Samuel Lockwood, of the Illinois
Supreme Court, made the argument in 1839. See id. at 285 n.74 (citing Field v. People, 3 Ill. 79, 162-173
(1839)). Brandeis also cites Senator George F. Edmunds as making the same claim during the
impeachment of Andrew Jackson. See id. at 285 n.74 (citing 3 IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON 84).
14
1 EDWARD CORWIN, CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 332 (Richard Loss ed., 1981).
15
DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1890, 41 (U. of
Chicago Press, 1997).
16
Id. at 41. Relying upon the works of Corwin and Currie, other scholars have recently reiterated the
claim that the executive power theory lacked majority support in the House. See Curtis Bradley & Martin
Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 662-63 (2004).
17
Id. at 41 n.240; Corwin, supra note 13, at 331 n.22.
18
To see how representatives voted on Benson’s crucial amendment and the House bill, see infra
Appendix I.
19
11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791, at 1028 (Charlene Bangs
Bickford et al. eds., 1992).
20
Id.
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amendment to delete this provision. By voting to delete text that might be read as
endorsing the congressional delegation theory, such representatives revealed their desire
for a House bill that endorsed the executive power theory. These were true executive
power partisans, said Corwin.21
Other representatives who eventually voted for the House bill first voted against
Benson’s amendment.22 Corwin concluded that these members must have desired a bill
that endorsed the congressional delegation theory because they voted to retain text that
could be read as delegating removal power to the president.23 In other words, those who
voted for the final bill but against Benson’s amendment must have been congressional
delegation partisans. By dividing on Benson’s amendment, the majority that eventually
approved the House bill supposedly revealed that it was divided, almost equally, between
executive power and congressional delegation proponents.24
These detailed critiques seemed to utterly devastate Chief Justice Taft’s claims
about the meaning of the Decision of 1789. If Brandeis and Corwin are right, no majority
ever regarded the Constitution as granting a presidential removal power. Instead, there
was a majority united on the text of the Foreign Affairs bill, but evenly divided as to
constitutional principle. The revisionists depict the Decision of 1789 something of a
“Non-Decision,” insofar as the Constitution’s meaning is concerned.
Using materials only recently made accessible by the scholars at the First Federal
Congress project,25 this article argues that Chief Justice Taft was right all along. Taft’s
critics have regarded shifting majority coalitions and a split on a particular amendment as
evidence that there was no majority in favor of any constitutional principle.26 His critics
are wrong. In passing three departmental acts that assumed the president enjoyed a
preexisting removal power, majorities in the House and Senate affirmed the executive
power theory on three separate occasions. Members of Congress understood that votes in
21

Corwin, supra note 13, at 331 n.22.
See infra Appendix I.
23
Corwin, supra note 13, at 331 n.22.
24
Id.
25
The First Federal Congress Project has produced 17 volumes of THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791 (Various eds., 1972-2004) [herinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS]. The materials relating to the Decision of 1789 are scattered
throughout these volumes, but some of the most revealing material (congressional correspondence) was
published only in 2004.
The best existing treatments of the Decision of 1789 are to be found in Edward Corwin, CORWIN ON
THE CONSTITUTION 317-71 (Richard Loss ed., 1981); James Hart, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION
1789, at 155-89 (1948); Charles C. Thach, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1776-1789, at
140-65 (1922); and David Currie, supra note 14, at 36-41. Of course, the various opinions in Myers, also
discuss the Decision of 1789. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
26
See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
22
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favor of the acts were votes favoring the executive power theory. Moreover, in the
aftermath of three votes, members of Congress and newspaper accounts described the
House and Senate votes on the Foreign Affairs bill and the subsequent departmental bills
as an endorsement of the theory that the Constitution granted the president a removal
power.
Part I of this article sketches a timeline across all three departmental acts and
acquaints the reader with the various removal positions. Part II attempts to answer two
mysteries never adequately resolved (much less addressed) by either Taft or his critics. If
all the representatives who voted for the House Foreign Affairs bill were true executive
power partisans, as Taft and others have assumed, why did a sizable number of these same
members first vote against Benson’s amendment (i.e., vote to retain text understood by
some as granting the president a removal power)? In other words, why would supposed
executive power partisans vote to retain text that could be read as endorsing the
congressional delegation theory? Neither Taft nor anyone else has ever explained this
conundrum.
Taft’s detractors have their own mystery to solve. Why did supposed
congressional delegation partisans vote for three acts that assumed that the president had
a pre-existing removal authority? If such representatives truly rejected the executive
power theory (as evidenced by their vote on Benson’s crucial amendment) their votes to
approve the three bills is confounding. After all, these representatives voted for bills that
assumed that the president had a constitutional removal power, when they supposedly
believed he had none. If they truly opposed the executive power theory, their votes for
these bills was akin to voting for three bills each of which spelled out what would happen
when the president removed a federal judge. No sensible Representative could ever vote
for a bill that wrongly assumed that the president may remove Article III judges.
Likewise, no true proponent of the congressional delegation theory should have voted for
three bills that assumed that the president had a constitutional removal power.
After posing solutions to these related mysteries, this article ends by briefly
discussing what the Decision of 1789 actually decided. What, if anything, does the
Decision of 1789 say about inferior executive officers, such as postmasters, or nonexecutive officers, such as the Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange
Commission? Moreover, what does the Decision of 1789 mean for whether Congress has
the right to constrain the president’s constitutional right of removal? Finally, did
members of Congress believe that the Decision of 1789 would have any precedential
value?
Decoding the Decision of 1789 is important for a host of reasons. To begin with,
there is a burgeoning “departmentalist” perspective asserting that divining the
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Constitution’s meaning is not the peculiar province of the courts—that the other
branches have an equal role in divining the Constitution’s meaning.27 The Decision
stands as perhaps the first meaningful instantiation of the departmentalist theory. Well
before judges began regularly interpreting the Constitution, members of Congress engaged
in an impressive and learned debate about the constitution’s meaning. If one is a
departmentalist or has sympathies for departmentalism, one should not overlook perhaps
the first major post-ratification debate about the Constitution’s meaning.
Even those who look only to the judiciary to establish the Constitution’s meaning
have reason to consider these debates. The Supreme Court has indicated that early
constitutional interpretations, including the Decision of 1789, are “weighty evidence” of
the Constitution’s true meaning.28 Indeed, Myers v. United States and Bowsher v. Synar29
have asserted that the Decision helps prove the correctness of the executive power
theory. If Justices Brandeis and Corwin are correct, however, the Court has drawn the
wrong conclusions from the Decision of 1789. 30
Finally, the Decision of 1789 belies those who suppose that constitutional
decisions rendered by the political branches must be inferior to those rendered by the
courts. The earnestness and erudition with which members of the House debated the
question of removal confirms that elected politicians are capable of staying true to their
constitutional oaths and need not be consumed by the desire to get reelected. For those
who want members of Congress to take their constitutional responsibilities seriously,31 and
for those who want to take the Constitution away from the Courts in order to leave it

27

For a review of the departmentalist literature, see Dawn E. Johnson, Departmentalism and Nonjudicial
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 105 (2004). The
scholar most responsible for reviving departmentalism was Michael Stokes Paulsen. See The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). Since Paulsen’s article, others
have defended departmentalism, although usually a less extreme strain of it. See, e.g., Gary Lawson &
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1270
(1996).
28

See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 789
(1983)). In Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., the Court said an act “passed by the first Congress assembled
under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, . . . is
contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning.” See 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888).
29

478 U.S. 714 (1986).
At least six Supreme Court cases have discussed the Decision of 1789 at some length. See Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897); United States ex rel.
Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. 284 (1855); Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230 (1839).
31
See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L. J.
1277 (2001).
30
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with the political branches,32 the Decision of 1789 is an exemplar of congressional
constitutional deliberation.
I. THE CREATION OF THE THREE GREAT DEPARTMENTS
The Articles of Confederation lacked an independent executive branch of
government.33 No separate Chief Executive or Executive Council superintended foreign
affairs and war powers; nor did any direct the execution of federal law. Instead, from
1776 onwards, the Continental Congress enjoyed the executive power over foreign affairs,
war, and law execution.34 In 1780-81, Congress abandoned its unworkable practice of
using internal congressional committees to handle these tasks and created executive
Departments of Foreign Affairs, War, and Treasury.35 Because these departments helped
implement Congress’ executive powers, they were completely under congressional
control.36
With the Constitution’s enactment, these departments became obsolete. It no
longer made sense to treat these departments as if they helped exercise congressional
powers. Under the Constitution, the president had many of the executive powers
formerly lodged with Congress. While Congress could continue to prescribe various
duties for these officers, the Constitution required that these executive officers serve
under the new Chief Executive’s control.37 Hence new departments were necessary.
A.

The Timeline

On May 19, 1789, New Jersey Representative Elias Boudinot presented to the
Committee of the Whole House a plan for the “arrangement of the executive
departments.”38 Boudinot said that the previous departments no longer existed in the
eyes of the law and even if they were extant, they were inappropriate models under the
Constitution.39 Though Boudinot wanted to begin consideration of a Treasury

32

See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
See Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A
Defense, 89 Minn. L. Rev. ___ (2005) (forthcoming).
34
See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 764-768;
Saikrishna Prakash and Michael Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L. J. 231, 27278 (2001).
35
See Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 33, at 766.
36
Id. at 766-67.
37
See id. at 790-93; The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, supra note 33, at 298-302.
38
10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 718.
39
Id.
33
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Department, James Madison thought it best to first decide the number of departments.40
Madison moved that there should be three departments, each with a Secretary to be
appointed by the president, with the Senate’s advice and consent, but to be removable by
the president alone.41
Immediately, William Smith of South Carolina objected that the appointments
provision could be read as granting an appointment power. The Constitution already
established that the president could appoint Secretaries with the Senate’s advice and
consent, noted Smith.42 After Madison declared that he was not wedded to the
appointments language,43 the Committee struck the appointments provision from
Madison’s motion.44
Immediately thereafter, some members objected to the removal provision, some
contending that impeachment was the only constitutional means of removal and others
arguing that the Senate had a constitutional right to participate in both the appointment
and removal of officers.45 A member of this latter group, Theoderick Bland of Virginia,
moved to add that removals would be “by and with the advice and consent of the
senate.”46 Bland’s motion failed.47 By a “considerable majority,” the Committee of the
Whole approved Madison’s resolution, including his removal provision.48
Two days later, on May 21, the House considered the Committee of the Whole’s
resolution and approved it without a division of Yeas and Neas.49 The House then
created a committee of eleven members to draft bills consistent with the resolution.50
This committee reported two departmental bills on June 2 and one more on June 4.51
But the removal controversy was not to be resolved with just one day’s debate.
On June 16, the Committee of the Whole took up the bill to establish the Department of
Foreign Affairs.52 Immediately, Alexander White of Virginia moved to delete the removal

40

10 id. at 720 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992).
Id.
42
10 id. at 726.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
10 id. at 727-39 (comments of Representatives Smith, Bland, Jackson, White, Silvester, Gerry).
46
10 id. at 738.
47
Id.
48
10 id. at 740.
49
3 id. at 68-69.
50
Id. at 68-69.
51
3 id. at 79, 82.
52
11 id. at 847.
41
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provision which provided that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was “to be removable from
office by the president of the United States.”53
For the next four days, members passionately and ably debated the
constitutionality of the removal provision, with many members once again claiming that
it was unconstitutional either because removal could be accomplished only upon an
impeachment conviction in the Senate or that the Senate had a constitutional right to
approve removals.54 In the face of such arguments, on June 19 the Committee of the
Whole, on a vote of 20 to 34, rejected a motion to delete the removal provision.55 With
such an exhaustive and spirited debate behind them, it seemed that the House had finally
settled the removal question. The text providing that the Secretary was “to be removable
by the president” would remain in the bill.
Once again, however, representatives could not resist reopening the removal
question. On June 22nd, the House took up the Foreign Affairs bill and agreed to various
amendments that had been proposed by the Committee of the Whole.56 Shortly after
taking up the amended bill which included the original removal language “to be
removable by the president”, Representative Egbert Benson of New York proposed an
amendment, “which he conceived more fully expressed the sense of the committee [of the
Whole], as it respected the constitutionality of the decision which had taken place [on
June 19th].”57 Benson moved to modify language referring to the Chief Clerk having
custody of departmental papers whenever there was a “vacancy” in the office of
Secretary.58 Instead of merely discussing vacancies, the new language would specifically
mention presidential removal: the Chief Clerk would have custody of papers “whenever
the said principal officer shall be removed by the president, or a vacancy in any other way
shall happen.”59 Benson also declared that if this first amendment succeeded, he then
would move to strike out the bill’s text that provided that the Secretary was “to be
removable by the president.” He thought that this latter text could be read to suggest
that the Congress was somehow granting or delegating removal authority. According to
Benson, this text ought to be deleted because a majority of the House actually endorsed
the executive power theory.60

53

11 id. at 842.
See generally 11 id. at 842-1026.
55
11 id. at 1024.
56
11 id. at 1026.
57
11 id. at 1027.
58
Id. Benson’s first amendment was to replace the following language: “in case of vacancy in the said
office of secretary to the United States for the department of foreign affairs.” Id.
59
Id.
60
11 id. at 1028.
54
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With relatively little discussion, the House passed Benson’s first amendment by a
vote of 30 to 18.61 His second amendment generated more discussion, but passed by a
vote of 31 to 19.62 As Appendix I makes clear, though the vote margins were similar, the
majority coalitions were quite different.63 Many members who had voted for Benson’s
first amendment, voted against his second. Nonetheless, because many members who
voted against the first amendment switched their votes as well and voted for the second,
Benson’s second amendment passed. On June 24, the House approved the entire bill,
including Benson’s successful amendments, on a vote of 29 to 22.64 As Appendix I
reveals, this time the majority coalition closely resembled the majority that approved
Benson’s first amendment.65
In mid-July, the Senate took up the bill. According to Pennsylvania Senator
William Maclay, the Vice president broke a 10-10 tie to help reject a proposal to strike
the entire reference to the president’s power of removal.66 Four days later on July 18, the
Vice president broke another tie, this time 9-9, to reject a motion to strike out the “by the
president” from the removal clause.67 Had either of these motions passed, the Senate’s
bill would not have affirmed any constitutional theory of removal. After the House
agreed to the Senate’s unrelated amendments, the president signed the Foreign Affairs
bill.68 By not granting removal authority and by discussing what would happen when the
president removed the Secretary, the Act assumed that the president had a preexisting
constitutionally-based removal power.69
Similar divisions emerged over the other departmental bills. Representative
Egbert Benson moved an amendment to the House War Department bill similar “to that
which had been obtained in the bill establishing the department of foreign affairs.”70
Benson’s amendment passed 24 to 22.71 Before approving a War Department bill that
included Benson’s preferred removal text, the Senate voted 10-9 to reject a motion to
delete the removal text.72 As with the Foreign Affairs Act, the War Department Act

61

3 id. at 92.
3 id. at 93.
63
See infra Appendix I, columns 1 and 2.
64
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 95.
65
See infra Appendix I, columns 1 and 3.
66
4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 697, n.4.
67
Id.
68
4 id. at 693.
69
See 1 Stat. 28, 29, § 2 (discussing who would have custody of papers “whenever the said principal
Officer shall be removed from Office by the President of the United States”).
70
11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 1044.
71
Id.
72
6 id. at 2032.
62
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discussed what would happen when the president removed the War Secretary,73 thereby
implying that Congress believed the president had preexisting removal authority.
The Treasury bill’s history is harder to trace. On June 25, in the Committee of
the Whole, Representative John Page of Virginia moved to strike the bill’s language
providing that the Treasury Secretary would serve at the president’s pleasure.74 Page’s
motion passed without debate.75 By the time the House sent the bill to the Senate, the
House had added language paralleling Benson’s second amendment to the Foreign Affairs
bill.76
Almost a month later, the Senate deleted the entire section of the Treasury bill
that contained this removal text and returned the bill to the House.77 Following
“considerable debate,” the House stood its ground and refused to accede to the Senate’s
amendment.78 After the Senate insisted on its removal deletion, a conference committee
accomplished little.79 Madison reported that in the opinion of the House members of the
conference committee, “it would not be right for the House to recede from their
disagreement”80, i.e., it would be wrong for the House to agree to the deletion of the
removal provision. Almost a month after first deleting the removal language, the Senate
finally approved the House bill, with the Vice-president once again breaking a 10-10 tie.81
Paralleling its counterparts, the Treasury Act included language that discussed who would
have custody of papers when the president removed the Secretary, thereby implying that
the Constitution itself granted the president a removal power.82
B.

Removal Theories

This timeline omits one of the most fascinating parts of the Decision of 1789—the
House debates about the constitutional mechanism for removal. Without simplifying too
73
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much, representatives voiced four claims: 1) Impeachment was the only means of
removal (the impeachment theory); 2) Because the Senate’s concurrence was necessary
to appoint, the president could not remove officers unless he secured the Senate’s
concurrence (the advice and consent theory); 3) Congress could decide who could
remove officers and should grant such power to the president (the congressional
delegation theory); 4) The Constitution’s grant of executive power enabled the
president to remove executive officers (the executive power theory).
Though there were four principal theories, there were not four static camps. The
situation was more fluid. Some members straddled positions, sometimes expressing one
view and other times another. James Madison declared that he had changed his mind
about the constitutional method of removal.83
1.

The Impeachment Theory

This theory had the fewest adherents, no more than two or three
Representatives.84 Its foremost (and tireless) proponent, William Smith of South
Carolina, played the expressio unius est exclusio alterius card: since the Constitution
expressly provided for removal through impeachment, this was the only means of
removing superior (non-inferior) officers.85 Relying upon English conceptions, Smith
seemed to believe that officers had a property interest in their offices.86 This meant that
they could not be deprived of their offices/property except when they had committed
some malfeasance.
However, Smith asserted that Congress could set terms of office for superior
officers, thus periodically culling out the incompetent and infirm.87 Moreover, Smith
claimed that because Congress could vest the appointment of inferior officers with the
president, the Heads of Departments, or Judges, Congress could vest removal power over
the inferior offices.88 Evidently, Smith thought that Congress could take some measures
to reduce the property value of offices.
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Smith’s position had its obvious weaknesses. To begin with, the expressio unius
argument could be used against his theory. Why specify that federal judges had tenure
during good behavior if all officers had a similar tenure?89 Arguably, the Constitution
specified judicial tenure during good behavior precisely because it was an exception to a
general rule that other officers did not have tenure during good behavior and could be
removed.90 Moreover, Smith’s theory, if accepted, also would have led to the splintering
and distribution of the president’s executive power, as it would have been difficult for a
new president to deal with holdover secretaries who could not be removed save through
impeachment. Still, Smith’s position had its attractions: it was relatively uncomplicated.
2.

The Advice and Consent Theory

A half dozen or so Representatives spoke up in favor of the theory that the
Senate’s concurrence was necessary to remove.91 Adherents of this theory clearly rejected
the notion that executive officers served during good behavior. Instead these members
claimed that the power to appoint, jointly vested in the president and Senate, implied a
parallel power to remove. Since the Senate had to approve appointments, it had to
consent to removals as well.92 Others viewed the Senate as an executive council, charged
with participating in every question relating to treaties and federal officers.93 Perhaps the
president could suspend an officer until the Senate acted on, one way or another, the
president’s removal request.94
Proponents of the executive power theory tried to turn the appointment argument
against proponents of the advice and consent theory. Even if it were true that the entity
appointing necessarily enjoyed an implied removal power, that logic did not mean that
the Senate had to consent to presidential removal. Some executive power proponents
claimed that the Senate formally did not participate in the appointment. While the
Senate’s consent was necessary to appoint, the president actually appointed persons to
offices.95 Hence if the appointing power necessarily enjoyed an implied removal power,
the president had sole possession of removal power because he alone appointed.
89
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Opponents of the advice and consent theory made a number of other claims.
Some rejected the “rule” that he who appoints may remove, arguing that removal
authority ought to be regarded as vested with the person responsible for the officer,
namely the president.96 Others claimed that the Senate’s impeachment role implied that
it had no other removal role. Indeed, if the Senate refused to remove after the president
sought removal, it would be awkward should the House later impeach the same officers,
for the Senate would have “prejudged” the case and refuse to impeach the officers.97
Executive power proponents also argued that the Senate’s executive functions were
limited to advising and consenting on treatymaking and appointments. The Constitution
did not make the Senate an all-purpose executive council, with a check on all of the
president’s executive functions.98 One of the most powerful objections was that a Senate
removal role would render the executive a two-headed monster and “reduce the president
to a mere vapor.”99 Officers would curry favor with Senators and thereby secure their
permanence.
As discussed earlier, the Committee of the Whole rejected an amendment to
provide that removals of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs could occur only with the
Senate’s advice and consent.100 Moreover, the final bill—because it assumed unilateral
presidential removal authority—clearly rejected the idea “that the two clauses allowing
senatorial participation in executive matters constituted the Senate a permanent
executive council.”101 While this theory had the one time support of Publius,102 it could
not muster majority support in the House.
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The Congressional Delegation Theory

This theory had its able champions who voiced the theory’s two simple
propositions: the Constitution did not grant a removal power and Congress could remedy
this shortcoming by delegating removal authority. Because the Constitution implied that
most offices (other than a handful such as the president and the Vice-president) would be
created by law, Congress could specify the terms and conditions of such offices, including
authorizing removal.103 The Necessary and Proper Clause not only authorized office
creation, it also sanctioned the grant of removal authority.104
Most of this theory’s supporters favored delegating removal power to the
president.105 Some representatives argued that the Constitution’s overall structure of
presidential responsibility for law execution, foreign affairs, and the conduct of wars
argued in favor of granting the president a removal power.106 Others spoke as if the
Constitution affirmatively obliged Congress to grant the president a removal power lest he
be burdened with constitutional duties that he could not fulfill. “The legislature has the
power to create and establish offices; but it is their duty so to modify them as to make
them conform to the general spirit of the Constitution.”107
Though Madison began as a partisan of the congressional delegation theory, he
eventually came to denounce it.108 He and others were wary of the theory’s
implications.109 If Congress could delegate removal authority wherever and however it
saw fit, Congress could delegate removal power to someone else other than the
president.110 Congress might even elect not to delegate removal authority at all.111 In
either case, the president would be unable to superintend the executive branch, as the
Constitution contemplated. Moreover, if Congress delegated removal authority to some
other entity, that institution, and not the president, would be the real Chief Executive.
Detecting the congressional delegation theory’s level of support is tricky. A
handful of representatives spoke in its favor at various times.112 But some of these also
103
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made statements that sounded like arguments in favor of the executive power view,
making them impossible to pigeonhole.113 Moreover, given the fluidity of positions, others
may have trod the same path as Madison and ultimately rejected the congressional
delegation theory.
Based on inferences, some scholars have maintained that this group was relatively
large, large enough to deny the executive power group an outright majority. As noted
earlier, many representatives who voted against removing the original Foreign Affairs bill
language that could be read as a grant or delegation of removal authority, went on to vote
for the bill containing the final removal language.114 Corwin and others have claimed
that such Representatives wanted to keep language implying delegation precisely because
they were congressional delegation partisans.115 Based on a combination of recorded
speeches and voting patterns, Corwin claimed that this group was composed of some
sixteen members, with seven vocal members and nine silent ones.116
4.

The Executive Power Theory

The adherents of this theory claimed that because the Constitution granted the
president the executive power and because removal was an executive power, the
president had a constitutional right to remove. Madison, with the zeal of a convert,
claimed that the “constitution affirms that the executive power shall be vested in the
president.” 117 Because the Constitution created some exceptions to the executive power
(such as the Senate’s participation in appointments), Madison concluded that Congress
could create no other exceptions. In his words, the “Legislature has no right to diminish
or modify his executive authority.” 118 Because the Constitution had clearly granted the
president the “executive power” and because Congress could not modify this executive
power, the question was a simple one:

113
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Is the power of displacing, an executive power? I conceive that if any
power whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power of appointing,
overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.
Others echoed Madison’s claims, such as Fisher Ames of Massachusetts119 and John
Vining of Delaware.120
Voicing arguments that still reverberate today, opponents of the executive power
theory made several claims: 1) the vesting of executive power did not convey any
independent power, merely vesting the specific powers mention in the remainder of
Article II121; 2) reading the vesting clause as if it vested power would make the remainder
of Article II superfluous122; 3) even if the vesting clause was a general grant, removal was
not an executive power, at least if the state constitutions were to be consulted as a
guide123; 4) arguments about a substantive grant of executive power were better suited for
European, monarchical countries124; and 5) that if the president had the removal power
he could toss aside incumbents willy-nilly, thereby depriving them of their “constitutional
rights” to their offices.
As noted earlier, some executive power partisans were unsatisfied with merely
securing language that ensured a presidential removal power over the Secretary.125 These
representatives wanted to make it clear that there was a House majority not merely
favoring a presidential removal power, but a majority behind the more precise proposition
that the Constitution itself granted the president a removal authority.126 Hence
Representative Egbert Benson proposed his two amendments. Just days after the majority
coalition had fended off remarkably persistent attempts to delete the original bill’s
119
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provision that the Secretary could be “removed from office by the president,” Benson
moved to strike this very language and add new language elsewhere that implied that the
president had a constitutional right to remove. It had become clear in the debates that
some read the original text as a grant of authority rather than a confirmation of
constitutional authority.127 According to Benson his amendments would more clearly
convey the majority’s conclusion that the president had constitutional removal authority
and therefore represent a legislative construction of the Constitution in favor the
executive power theory.128
Ironically, the votes on Benson’s two amendments and the final bill have not
generated a clear consensus on the meaning of the Decision of 1789. In the minds of
some scholars and judges, Benson’s amendments accomplished nothing, except perhaps
to perpetuate the ambiguity. The next section explains that Benson’s amendments
actually were a success because they generated a bill that clearly endorsed the executive
power theory. In particular the next section explains why some members seemingly voted
against the executive power theory, but then went on to vote for a Foreign Affairs bill
that endorsed the executive power theory because the bill assumed the president had
constitutional removal authority.
II. DEMYSTIFYING THE DECISION OF 1789
Two mysteries remain unsolved to this day. First, why did representatives who
supposedly favored the executive power theory first vote to retain text that appeared to
James Madison and Egbert Benson as a delegation of removal authority? For lack of a
better description, we will call this group of 13 representatives—those who voted against
Benson’s second amendment and for the House bill—the “enigmatic faction.”129 Taft’s
detractors, such as Brandeis and Corwin, contend that if Taft was right—if all members
who voted for the final bill favored the executive power theory—members of the
enigmatic faction ought to have voted for Benson’s second amendment (the amendment
which would have deleted language that could be read as a grant of removal authority).
Taft’s critics claim that by voting against this amendment and hence voting to retain the
delegation language, members of the enigmatic faction effectively signaled their
endorsement of the congressional delegation theory.130 More importantly, because the 29
127
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person majority in favor of the House bill was composed of so many members of the
enigmatic faction, the executive power theory never commanded a House majority. In
other words, though a majority obviously favored the House bill, the executive power
theory did not actually enjoy majority support.131 Corwin claimed that the executive
power theory enjoyed the support of about sixteen members.132
The second mystery also relates to the enigmatic faction. Why would members of
the enigmatic faction—supposed congressional delegation partisans in the eyes of
Brandeis and Corwin—vote for a Foreign Affairs bill that delegated no removal authority,
that was proposed as a means of endorsing the executive power theory, and that seemed
to endorse that theory? Because the bill spoke of what would happen when the president
removed the Secretary and never conveyed any authority, it seemed to very well imply
that the president had some preexisting removal authority. Since the only source of such
authority could be the Constitution, the bill seemed to endorse the executive power
theory, as Benson and Madison had hoped. If members of the enigmatic faction actually
opposed the executive power theory, they ought to have voted against the House bill
rather than voting for it. Brandeis and Corwin say nothing about this troubling feature of
their claim about the enigmatic faction.133
A.

Possible Solutions Considered and Rejected

Neither Taft nor any of his supporters have ever responded to the serious
challenge posed by Brandeis and Corwin.134 This suggests either a failure to understand
the challenge or an inability to develop an adequate response to a seemingly powerful
critique. By the same token, Taft’s critics seem unaware of the parallel difficulties with
their account. Brandeis and Corwin focus on the votes on Benson’s amendments without
saying anything about the vote on the House bill itself.135 Their curious silence also
suggests a weakness in their reading. This subpart considers some possible solutions, each
of which has its flaws.
Trying to solve these mysteries, a defender of Brandeis and Corwin might assert
that congressional delegation partisans who favored presidential removal swallowed hard
and voted for a bill that assumed a presidential removal power. They sought to retain the
131
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congressional delegation language, but having lost that vote they decided to at least
satisfy their policy preference at the expense of their constitutional theory. This reading
supposes that congressional delegation partisans abandoned their constitutional
principles.
Other defenders of the Brandeis/Corwin thesis might instead claim that
congressional delegation partisans voted for the final bill because it did not actually
contradict their constitutional theory. The final bill did not expressly claim that the
president had a constitutional removal power.136 The bill merely said that when the
president removed the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary would have custody of
departmental papers.137 Under this view, the bill’s removal language was harmless, for it
discussed an eventuality that was constitutionally impossible. Because the final bill really
said nothing of consequence relating to removal, congressional delegation partisans could
vote for it and not abandon their convictions.
Finally, some might suppose that congressional delegation partisans read the final
House bill as somehow endorsing their theory. Once again, the bill did not expressly
endorse the executive power theory. Nor did it expressly reject the congressional
delegation theory. By discussing what would happen when the president removed the
Secretary, perhaps the bill actually contained an implicit grant of removal authority from
Congress, thus implicitly endorsing the congressional delegation theory.
None of these explanations are persuasive. First, almost all congressional
delegation partisans wanted the president to enjoy a removal power. Yet such partisans
logically could not satisfy their policy preference by voting for a bill that did not grant
removal authority. If one wishes to ensure that the president enjoys a removal power and
also firmly believes that the president lacks a removal power until Congress grants it, one
does not ensure the existence of a presidential removal power by voting for a bill that
assumes that the president had a preexisting removal power. It was impossible for pure
congressional delegation partisans to believe that a vote for the House bill could satisfy
their policy preference for presidential removal authority.
Second, it also seems rather unlikely that in the early months of Congress, with
the Constitution’s ratification so fresh in their memory and having recently taken the first
Article VI required oaths in support of the Constitution,138 that the congressional
delegation partisans casually tossed aside their constitutional scruples merely to satisfy
136

See 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 696-97.
See 4 id. at 697 (discussing who would have custody of departmental papers “whenever the
[Secretary] shall be removed from office by the President of the U.S.”).
138
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned . . . shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”).
137

2005

New Light on the Decision of 1789

21

their policy preferences for a president who could remove. Consistent with this intuition,
no member of the enigmatic faction ever explained their vote as the triumph of
pragmatism over principle. Nor did anyone ever charge that members of the enigmatic
faction cast constitutionally insincere votes. Rather, members praised the level of the
debate and the sincerity of the members.139
Third, it is extremely unlikely that congressional delegation partisans felt
comfortable voting for the final bill because they regarded its removal language as serving
no purpose. It is true that the final bill never expressly provided that Congress believed
that the president had a preexisting constitutional removal power. Nonetheless, it seems
farfetched to suppose that members of Congress knowingly voted for bills containing
removal language that they regarded as dross, especially since a supermajority of the
House clearly did not regard the language as empty or useless.140 Moreover, one also has
to suppose that enigmatic members silently rejected the construction put on the final bill
by Benson and Madison, the two representatives most responsible for the final bill
language. No member of the enigmatic faction ever claimed that they voted for the
House bill because its removal language was a harmless nullity.
Finally, it is extremely difficult to read the final Foreign Affairs bill that emerged
from the House (or its counterpart War and Treasury Department bills) as somehow
containing an implicit grant of removal authority to the president. First, the language of
the bills (and the eventual Acts) most naturally reads like they each assume that the
president already had a removal power, even in the absence of any congressional statute.
This is especially true when one considers the legislative debates that preceded the
crafting of the final language. Moreover, the amendments which led to the eventual
removal language were expressly proposed as an endorsement of the executive power
theory and as a rejection of the congressional delegation theory. Third, there is no
evidence that anyone actually regarded the bills or Acts as a delegation of removal
authority. No member of Congress ever claimed that the House Foreign Affairs bill (or
the other bills) endorsed the congressional delegation theory. Lastly, the members of the
enigmatic faction had voted to retain language that could be read as a delegation,
suggesting that if they were congressional delegation partisans they understood that the
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bill that would result from Benson’s two amendments repudiated the congressional
delegation theory and would endorse the executive power theory.
Defenders of Taft’s position might make more plausible claims. Taft’s defenders
might borrow a page from Justice Antonin Scalia and argue that it does not matter why
representatives voted for the final bill. From a textualist perspective, the final bill clearly
contemplated a constitutional power of removal in the president’s hands. What members
had in their minds is of no significance. Or Taft’s defenders might claim that
Representatives who voted to retain the congressional delegation language were not
firmly entrenched congressional delegation partisans but were open to the executive
power theory. Their openness permitted them to become executive power supporters, of
whatever intensity, by the time of the final vote. Such defenders might even cite
Madison’s change of heart. 141
Neither of these explanations is entirely satisfactory. One of the reasons we might
defer to the constitutional readings of early congressmen, presidents, and judges is
because we believe that these actors, being closer to the Constitution’s creation, actually
believed the readings they espoused. Saying that all that matters is the bill’s text,
however, suggests that we do not really care what these actors thought about the Foreign
Affairs bill or the Constitution. If representatives were tricked into accepting the removal
language by virtue of Benson’s decision to propose two amendments or if the final
removal language resulted from some accident, these circumstances ought to affect how
much deference to accord to the Decision of 1789.
Similarly, it seems unlikely that thirteen representatives changed their mind about
the relative merits of the executive power and congressional delegation theories. There
was no debate between the vote on Benson’s second amendment and the vote on the
House bill that might have changed minds or revealed a change of heart. Moreover, no
one ever claimed that anyone’s mind (other than Madison’s) had been changed on the
relative merits of these theories.
Perhaps a combination of these theories has some explanatory power. Maybe the
votes of a few representatives can be explained on these grounds. Yet given the lack of
evidence backing any of these explanations, it seems unlikely that any combination of
these reasons helps demystify most or all of the votes of the enigmatic faction.
There is a much better theory for the enigmatic faction’s vote, one that does not
ask us to suppose that many members sacrificed their principles and one that does not
suppose that members of the enigmatic faction had a last-minute change of heart.
141
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A Blindsided Majority Divided by Tactics, not Principles

The best explanation for the supposedly inconsistent votes of the thirteen
members of the enigmatic faction is that most (if not all) of them were not guilty of
casting inconsistent votes. All the while, members of the enigmatic faction favored (with
varying intensity) the executive power theory and merely differed with other executive
power partisans about tactics.
How could those who voted against Benson’s second amendment actually be
executive power partisans? Answers can be found in the legislative debates, newspaper
summations of those debates, and in the House members’ private letters. Laying out all
the evidence will take some time. For now, here is a summary of the reasons why a vote
against Benson’s second amendment likely was not a vote against the executive power
theory.
First, some executive power proponents voted against Benson’s second
amendment because they regarded the original language as a useful congressional
“declaration” about the Constitution. Despite the arguments of Benson and Madison,
some members clearly thought that the original text was a more open and unequivocal
affirmation of the executive power theory, especially as compared to the bill that would
result from the passage of Benson’s second amendment.
Second, some supporters likely voted against Benson’s second amendment
because they were surprised by it and were not sure what to make of it. Having
participated in (or having witnessed) four days of debates on whether to retain the
original removal language, some members of the executive power coalition recoiled at the
idea of deleting the very language they fought so hard to preserve. This hypothesis also
explains why opponents of the executive power grant theory actually joined Madison,
Benson, and others to remove the bill’s original removal language. Having fought to
remove the original removal text once in May and once again in June, they took pleasure
in seizing an opportunity to delete it, even if its removal was in the service of a subset of
executive power partisans.
Third, some representatives likely thought that voting to delete the removal
language seemed like a concession. To fight to retain some legislative language, only to
abandon it within days, seemed more like a capitulation than a clarification. Consistent
with this theory, many opponents of the House bill needled the majority, delighting in the
notion that the majority had somehow conceded a substantial point.
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Fourth, some representatives might have feared that removing the original
removal language might split the majority. Even if they did not regard Benson’s second
amendment as a capitulation, they had to be aware that others might so regard it.
Representatives who viewed Benson’s second amendment as a defeat might go onto vote
against any final bill that included the amendment and thereby doom the final bill.
Finally, some representatives may have favored both the executive power theory
and the congressional delegation theory. Brandeis and Corwin assumed that if some
member favored the congressional delegation theory, they could not also have favored the
executive power theory. But some members might have thought that if the executive
power theory was wrong—if a court (or a president for that matter) concluded that the
Constitution did not grant removal authority—the original bill language could be read as
a delegation of removal authority. Hence some executive power partisans might have
wanted to retain text that could be read as an affirmation of the executive power theory
and, secondarily, as a delegation of removal power.
These theories explain how many members who voted against Benson’s second
amendment nonetheless had no real difficulty voting for the House bill. The enigmatic
faction consisted of executive power partisans who favored different tactics than did the
Benson/Madison faction. While the House bill lacked the original removal language that
many of these representatives clearly preferred, it still confirmed, albeit in an understated
way, that the president had a constitutionally based grant of removal power.
1. Benson’s Troublesome Amendments
To better explain the votes of the enigmatic faction, we need to dissect the crucial
events that took place on June 22, 1789. Recall that Representative Egbert Benson,
reacting to the claim that the majority favoring removal consisted of two clashing
factions,142 had proposed two amendments. Hoping to clarify the Decision of 1789 for
posterity, Benson’s amendments were meant to make it clear that the executive power
theory enjoyed an outright majority. The initial removal language “appeared somewhat a
grant. Now, the mode he took would evade that point, and establish a legislative
construction of the constitution.”143 Benson thought that if Congress enacted the original
language that might make removal “subject[] to legislative instability,”144 presumably
142

See, e.g., 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 849
11 id. at 1028. W hen the Committee of the Whole first discussed the departments, Benson
regarded the language of Madison’s resolution as a “mere declaration of the Legislative construction” of the
Constitution. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 373 (Gales & Seaton eds.). That resolution provided that the
Secretary was “to be removable by the President.” 1 id. at 371.
144
11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 1030.
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because subsequent Congresses might conclude that the first Congress had granted the
president a removal power. Benson’s two amendments, he believed, “more fully express
the sense of the committee [of the whole], as it respected the constitutionality of the
decision which had taken place.”145
James Madison agreed with Benson’s motion and sentiments. The bill’s language
relating to removal could be viewed as a grant.146 Madison “wished every thing like
ambiguity expunged, and the sense of the house explicitly declared.” Representatives
“have all along proceeded on the idea that the constitution vests the power in the president
. . . . Now, as the words proposed by [Benson] expressed to his mind the meaning of the
constitution, he should be in favor of them, and would agree to strike out those agreed to
in committee.”147 Madison also claimed that the original bill text was unnecessary
because the first amendment “fully contains the sense of this house upon the doctrine of
the constitution.”148 Consistent with Benson and Madison’s claims, the Gazette of the
United States reported that the “principal reason assigned for striking out” was that the
original language “appears to be a grant of power; whereas it was presumed to be the sense
of the committee [of the Whole], that the power was vested in the president by the
Constitution.”149
Shortly after Madison spoke, the House, by a vote of 30 to 18, approved Benson’s
first amendment.150 Most likely, members of the enigmatic faction regarded this
amendment as largely inconsequential because it added another provision discussing
removal by the president.151 By itself, it left undisturbed the bill’s existing removal
language.

145

11 id. at 1027. On June 17, Benson actually declared that he was going to propose an amendment
to the original House bill because “it has the appearance of conferring the power upon” the president. He
thought this improper “because it would be admitting the house to be possessed of an authority which
would destroy those checks and balances.” This amendment would “change in the manner of expression,
that so the law may be nothing more than a declaration of our sentiments upon the meaning of a
constitutional of power to the president.” 11 id. at 931-32.
146
11 id. at 1029.
147
11 id. at 1029 (emphasis added).
148
11 id. at 1031.
149
11 id. at 1027-28. In a letter written before Benson proposed his amendments, Representative
Thomas Fitzsimmons agreed with Benson and Madison characterization of the majority position.
Fitzsimmons noted that the advocates of the removal clause claimed that the removal power was “Vested in
the President in the General Powers of the Executive.” See Letter of Thomas Fitzsimmons to Benjamin
Rush, (June 20, 1789), in 16 id. at 820.
150
3 id. at 92.
151
11 id. at 1030 (comments of Rep. Theodore Sedgewick that the first amendment could do no
harm). In truth, the amendment was quite consequential, because the combination of Benson’s two
amendments helped establish that the executive power theory enjoyed majority support.
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The House immediately took up Benson’s second amendment—to delete the
language that could be read as a grant of removal authority.152 Though this amendment
ultimately passed by a vote of 31 to 19,153 it triggered much discussion and caused much
consternation. Brandeis, Corwin, and others have claimed that those who voted against
the second amendment thereby signaled their opposition to the executive power theory
and their support for the congressional delegation theory. 154
If one focused on the arguments of Madison and Benson only, Brandeis and
Corwin might seem correct. After all, Madison and Benson claimed the old language
could be read to endorse the congressional delegation grant theory.155 At least some
opponents of the House bill, such as Elbridge Gerry156 and Thomas Tudor Tucker,157
seemed to agree. If everyone agreed that the original bill actually endorsed the
congressional delegation theory and that the amended bill reflected the executive power
theory, then the enigmatic faction’s rejection of Benson’s second amendment does seem
like an implicit repudiation of the executive power theory.
But not everyone agreed that Benson’s second amendment was the best means of
vindicating the executive power theory. To begin with, not even Madison and Benson
believed that the original language obviously endorsed the congressional delegation
theory.158 They merely claimed that it could be so read. Hence even under Madison and
Benson’s view of the original text, a vote to retain that text was not necessarily a vote
against the executive power theory (or a vote favoring the congressional delegation
theory).
More importantly, when one focuses on what members of the enigmatic faction
said, it becomes rather clear that a vote against Benson’s second amendment hardly
signaled opposition to the executive power theory. Many members of the enigmatic
faction probably concluded that whereas the original bill expressly declared that the
president had a removal power, the amended bill left presidential removal to shadowy
implication. For such members, voting against Benson’s second amendment was actually
a vote in favor of the executive power theory. Others were surprised by Benson’s motion
and thought that it seemed to be an unwarranted and unnecessary concession to the
opposition.
152

11 id. at 1030.
3 id. at 93.
154
See Corwin, supra note 13, at 332; Currie, supra note 14, at 41. See also Myers, 272 U.S., at 285
n.75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (saying same).
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11 id. at 1028-29, 1031-32.
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11 id. at 1033.
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11 id. at 1034-35.
158
Benson originally thought that the bill’s language endorsed the executive power theory. See supra
note 147. So did Madison. 11 id. at 986.
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Four members of the enigmatic faction voiced their opposition to Benson’s second
amendment: Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania, John
Laurance of New York, and Theodore Sedgewick of Massachusetts. Elias Boudinot said
he “was against the motion, because the constitution vested all executive power in the
president.”159 He had “inferred” that the president “ex officio” could “remove, without
limitation; but as the debates arose, and the question being seriously agitated, he was
clear for making a congressional declaration, in order to prevent future inconvenience.”160
Boudinot also argued that to switch positions so quickly “argued a fickleness which he
hoped to never see affect this honorable body.”161 If the majority was right before, it
ought to remain steadfast and keep the original bill text.
Far from opposing the executive power theory, Boudinot clearly favored it. He
merely supposed that the original bill language was a superior expression of the executive
power theory and apparently was quite disturbed by the last minute appeal to delete the
removal language that they had fought to preserve over the course of a month.
Consistent with this classification of Boudinot, neither Brandeis nor Corwin count him as
a congressional delegation partisan even though he was a member of the enigmatic
faction, i.e., even though he voted against Benson’s second amendment.162
This classification of Boudinot raises an extremely difficult question for the
revisionist account. Apart from Boudinot, Brandeis and Corwin treat each member of the
enigmatic faction as if he were a congressional delegation partisan. They classify
Boudinot differently because they know that he expressed pro-executive power positions
earlier in the debate. But once they admit that at least one executive power partisan
voted against Benson’s second amendment (Boudinot), they need to be open to the
obvious possibility that others who voted against Benson’s second amendment were also
executive power partisans. In other words, with Boudinot as an unmistakable example,
Brandeis and Corwin should have realized that other members of the enigmatic faction
might have been “Boudinot executive power partisans”—executive power proponents
who opposed Benson’s second amendment.
Yet Brandeis and Corwin apparently never considered this prospect. They just
assumed that votes against Benson’s second amendment must have been votes against the
executive power theory. Perhaps their classification of some representatives as procongressional delegation partisans can be justified based on what some representatives
said at earlier points in the debate. Indeed, Corwin claims that seven delegates said
159

11 id. at 1034.
Id.
161
Id.
162
See Myers, 272 U.S. at 285 n. 73; Corwin, supra note 13, at 332 n.22.
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something in favor of the congressional delegation theory.163 But Corwin also hastily
claims that there were nine “silent” representatives who favored the congressional
delegation theory.164 Because his only evidence for the views of these silent members is a
vote on Benson’s second amendment, Corwin actually has no evidence at all that these
silent members actually favored the congressional delegation theory over the executive
power theory.
Other members of the enigmatic faction who spoke up on June 22, 1789 also
suggest that, like Elias Boudinot, they too endorsed the executive power theory.
Representative John Laurance said he believed that the legislature “had power to
establish offices on what terms they pleased.” He went on to say that Congress could
abuse this power and “abridge the constitutional power of the president respecting the
removal of such officers.” To avoid the possibility that Congress might constrain
presidential power, Laurance wanted to retain the original bill language.165 Earlier,
Laurance also said that he viewed the original language as a “legislative declaration.”166
Laurance’s comments suggest that he favored the original text because he, like Boudinot,
viewed it as an express congressional declaration in favor of the executive power theory.
Laurence’s comments also suggest that he agreed with Madison that the legislative grant
theory was problematic precisely because it permitted Congress to withhold removal
authority from the president. Like Boudinot, Laurance likely was someone who voted for
the final bill because it endorsed the executive power theory, albeit imperfectly.167
Thomas Hartley advised that all those “not fully convinced that the power of
removal [was] vested by the Constitution in the president” should vote against Benson’s
second amendment. 168 He admitted that he had “some doubts himself.”169 But he had no
doubts about granting authority to the president. Hartley’s comments suggest that while
he clearly preferred the original language, he was not opposed to the executive power
theory. He merely had doubts, as perhaps did many of the outright executive power
partisans.
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Corwin, supra note 13, at 331 n.22.
Id.
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11 id. at 1034.
166
11 id. at 1028.
167
Brandeis and Corwin count Laurance as someone who spoke in defense of the congressional
delegation theory. In fact, Laurance’s comments are much more equivocal. Laurance clearly thought that
if the Constitution did not grant anyone removal authority, Congress could delegate such authority. But he
never took a firm position on whether the Constitution was silent on removal. Sometimes he seems to say
the power of removal is lodged with the president. See 11 id. at 908. Other times he seems to say the
Constitution does not assign the removal power. See 11 id. at 908-909.
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11 id. at 1035 (emphasis added).
169
11 id. at 1035.
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Certainly, Hartley’s previous statements do not evince hostility to the executive
power theory. On June 17, Hartley said that a “fair construction of the constitution”
required that the president control the business of the Department of Foreign Affairs.170
Moreover, Hartley’s subsequent writings suggest that though he might have preferred the
original text, he nonetheless supported the executive power theory.171 Evidently,
Hartley’s misgivings about Benson’s second amendment were insubstantial for he voted
for the House bill which endorsed the executive power theory.
Of the four members of the enigmatic faction who spoke up on June 22nd,
Theodore Sedgwick seems the closest to a true legislative grant partisan. But even he
does not fit neatly within that category. During the debate, Sedgewick did assert that a
delegation of removal authority was necessary because Congress had “complete power
over the duration of the offices they created.”172 But he also claimed that the majority
was divided into two factions: one that thought the president had a constitutional
removal power and one that thought that Congress “must give it to the president on
principles of the constitution.”173 This latter comment suggested that Sedgewick believed
that Congress was constitutionally obliged to grant the president removal authority, a
position that closely borders on the executive power theory.
As a matter of tactics, keeping the original removal text was crucial, claimed
Sedgewick. No harm would come if he was wrong about the Constitution, because if the
pure executive power partisans were right, the president had removal authority no matter
what the bill said.174 But, said Sedgewick, if the pure executive power partisans’ reading
of the Constitution was wrong and they succeeded in stripping out the text that could be
read as a grant of removal authority, the president clearly would lack removal authority.175
Hence, Sedgewick claimed that prudence required that the original removal text be
retained.
170

11 id. at 904.
See 16 id. at 1209, 1241, 1262 (comments of Hartley on the meaning of House vote on removal
and on the Senate’s reluctance to endorse the executive power principle in Treasury Act).
Brandeis and Corwin count Hartley as a congressional delegation proponent, presumably based on his
comments on Benson’s second amendment and on his earlier comments. As noted, Hartley’s comments on
Benson’s amendments do not evince hostility to the executive power theory, just doubts. His earlier
comments asserted that Congress could delegate removal power if the constitution was silent. Yet Hartley
never clearly said that he believed that the Constitution was silent. He merely said if it was, Congress could
remedy the defect. See 11 id. at 896, 904-907. There appears to be nothing in Hartley’s earlier speeches
that indicates that Hartley either clearly endorsed the congressional delegation theory or that he clearly
opposed the executive power theory.
172
11 id. at 1033.
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Sedgewick’s earlier comments only compound the difficulty of properly classifying
him. In the early days of the debate, Sedgewick said that because the government
required a capable and effective removal power, “the power must be conferred upon the
president by the constitution, as the executive officer of the government.”176 Later
Sedgewick claimed that even though he favored the congressional delegation theory, he
also thought “it was more plausibly contended that the power of removal was more
constitutionally in the president, than in the president and senate; but he did not say that
the arguments on either side were conclusive.”177 He also said it would be absurd for the
president to lack removal authority over the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, because the
Secretary was but the president’s instrument.178 When one examines his earlier
statements about the executive power theory and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, it
seems likely that Sedgewick voted for the House bill because he felt comfortable (albeit
not entirely happy) endorsing the executive power theory.
Review of what members of the enigmatic faction actually said shows little actual
hostility to the executive power theory. Some thought the original language better
reflected the executive power theory (Boudinot and Laurance); others merely had some
doubts about the executive power theory (Hartley); and still others favored the
congressional delegation theory but claimed that the constitution required a legislative
grant of removal power to the president, at least in the case of the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs (Sedgewick). Most of these members said nothing that would prevent them from
voting for the executive power theory embodied in the final bill.
Some members who voted for Benson’s second amendment but against the House
bill also thought that the original text better expressed the executive power theory.
Representative John Page accused the majority of abandoning the idea of an express
declaration in favor of the executive power theory. “[I]t was now left to be inferred from
the constitution, that the president had the power of removal, without even a legislative
declaration on that point.”179 The majority thereby had “evacuated untenable ground”
which they previously insisted upon.180 Similarly, Representative William Smith of South
Carolina claimed that the majority had come to realize that they were wrong. Would
they “pretend to carry their point by a side blow, when they are defeated by fair argument
on due reflection?” Smith thought it “more candid and manly” to make a declaration in
“direct terms than by an implication.”181
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James Madison understood that changing tactics midstream might cause problems
and tried to assuage his coalition. The opposition “cannot fairly urge against us a change
of ground, because the point we contended for is fully obtained by the amendment.”182
He also claimed that the amendment “had no other effect than varying the declaration
which the majority were inclined to make” and was not a “dereliction of the principle
hitherto contended for.”183 Madison clearly felt that the executive power theory had a
majority all along and that Benson’s two amendments would result in text that more
clearly affirmed the executive power theory. Given the votes of the enigmatic faction and
what was said by Boudinot and others, Madison’s hand holding was not entirely
persuasive.
Newspaper summations of the debate bear out that votes against Benson’s second
amendment were not votes against the executive power theory. The Gazette of the
United States claimed that people who opposed Benson’s second amendment supposed
“that retaining the words, would be an additional evidence of the sense of the House that
the power was vested in the president.”184 In other words, some people voted against
Benson’s second amendment because they believed the original language was a better
declaration of the executive power theory. The New York Daily Gazette added that some
voted against the second amendment “with a view of obviating any charge of
inconsistency.”185 In other words, notwithstanding Madison’s pleas, some members of the
enigmatic faction likely voted against Benson’s second amendment after hearing the
minority chortle that the amendment was actually an overdue and welcome admission of
weaknesses in the executive power theory. Representative Smith’s challenge to the
majority’s masculinity likely had an effect.
Contemporary newspaper accounts tell the same story. Fisher Ames, writing on
June 23, one day after the vote on Benson’s amendments, claimed that those who voted
against the second amendment regarded the original language as a superior means of
expressing the executive power theory. The original language “operate[d] as a
declaration of the Constitution; and at the same (time) expressly dispose of the power.”
Some representatives also opposed Benson’s proposal to delete the original language
because they were worried that “any change in position” might divide the majority and
endanger the final vote.186 Finally Ames said he was satisfied that the president could
exercise the removal power “either by the Constitution or the authority of an act. The
arguments in favor of the former fall short of a full proof, but in my mind they greatly
182

11 id. at 1032.
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preponderate.”187 Ames’ comments suggest that some of those who voted against
Benson’s second amendment believed that the original bill language was a better
declaration of executive power principles and that the original bill could be read as a
delegation if the executive power theory was wrong. Ames’ comments also raise the
possibility that people might have favored both the executive power and the legislative
delegation theories and ultimately chose to favor the former on the final vote.
Echoing Ames’ claims, Peter Muhlenberg wrote that the majority was divided on
the principle of whether to make an express removal declaration. Though a “Considerable
Majority of the House have determined that the power of removal is vested solely in The
president as the Chief Executive Magistrate,”188 this majority was divided: one group
thought it the “duty of the Legislature to declare by Law where this power is Lodged, in
order to prevent Confusion hereafter.”189 Presumably, these were the executive power
partisans who voted to reject Benson’s second amendment. The other part of the
majority thought to make an express congressional declaration regarding removal “would
imply a doubt, & that nothing more was [illegible] necessary than something of the
Declaratory kind expressive in the sense of The House on the subject.”190 In other words,
these members voted for Benson’s second amendment which clearly implied a removal
power.
In another letter, Ames suggested that another reason for the division in the
executive power camp was a lack of “caucusing and cabal.” The House is not
“sufficiently preconcerted.
Mr. Brown’s [Benson’s]
amendment was such, and it had some effect to divide
those whom zeal for the right interpretation of the Constitution
had united into a corps. It was a good amendment. Some
voted against it from the vexation they felt in having the
ground changed.”191
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Letter from Peter Muhlenberg to Benjamin Rush (June 25, 1789), in 16 id. at 855-56 (emphasis
added). Though Muhlenberg’s letter is dated June 25, 1789, it is unclear whether Muhlenberg wrote his
letter before or after the vote on Benson’s amendments. If, as is more likely, he wrote about the majority
that voted for the original bill in the Committee of the Whole, he confirms that this majority was composed
of executive power partisans. If he wrote after the House vote on the final bill, he confirms that the
majority on the final bill was united in believing that the president had a constitutional removal power but
divided about the best way of expressing that belief.
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Ames’ letter suggests two things—that there was a majority for the executive power
theory and that this camp became divided because many of its members did not know
what to make of Benson’s second amendment that seemed to many a surprise.192 Some
members did not know what to make of an amendment that deleted removal language
that they had previously insisted upon for over a month.
Finally, members were able to vote for the executive power theory even if they
also saw merit in the congressional delegation theory because they thought the executive
power theory was the superior theory of the two. In the debates, Fisher Ames had said
that when gentlemen who thought the constitution was silent “revert to the principles,
spirit, and tendency of the constitution, they will be compelled to acknowledge, that
there is the highest degree of probability” that the president had a removal power.193
Ames’ public comments mirror his comments in the private letter mentioned above,
where he claimed that the arguments for the executive power theory “greatly
preponderate.” Likewise, John Vining declared in the debates that he conceived the
removal power to be granted either “incidental to the executive department, or under
that clause which gives Congress all powers necessary and proper.”194 Vining’s comments
suggest that he believed that the Constitution itself granted the president a removal
power but if that was not the case, Congress could delegate a power. Delegates who made
comments that seemed to favor the congressional delegation theory may have concluded
that they could support the executive power theory under the same logic. Although the
executive power theory was not without its flaws, it had the better arguments.
Taken together, these debates and letters indicate that members of the enigmatic
faction did not vote against Benson’s second amendment because they opposed the
executive power theory, as Brandeis and Corwin have claimed. Instead, those who voted
against the second amendment regarded the original language as superior: 1) they
believed it more clearly expressed the sense of the House that the president had a
constitutional removal power, rather than leaving it to implication195; 2) they were
192

Although Benson had declared on June 17 that he would propose an amendment that would clarify
that there was a majority in favor of the view that the Constitution granted a removal power to the
president, see supra note 147, he did not actually propose his clarifying amendment until June 22nd, after the
Committee of the Whole’s vote on the original bill. So even though Benson had said he would propose an
amendment, he did so well after he made his declaration. Moreover, he did not reveal that he was going to
propose deleting the removal language that many had fought to retain. Hence it is not surprising that
Benson’s amendments caught members unawares. His June 17th declaration, which only briefly discussed
why he would propose an amendment, was evidently not enough notice.
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11 id. at 978.
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11 id. at 939.
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Consider, in this regard, Thomas Hartley’s letter in which he says that several Representatives
“would be better pleased” had the original removal clause been left in the bill. See Letter from Thomas
Hartley to Tench Coxe (June 24, 1789), in 16 id. at 848. Although Hartley has been regarded as a
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surprised that they were being asked to delete language that they had successfully
retained; 3) they were irritated and perhaps chagrined that they were being asked to
vote for an amendment that seemed like a concession to the opposition; 4) they were
afraid (wrongly, as it turned out) that this amendment would split the majority on the
final bill because it might be viewed as a capitulation that amounted to snatching defeat
from the jaws of victory;196 and 5) they supposed that if the majority’s reading of the
Constitution was wrong, the original language would delegate a removal power whereas
Benson’s amendments left a bill that could not be regarded as a delegation.
Representatives in the latter group likely saw merit in both the congressional delegation
and executive power theories. One could believe that the Constitution granted the
president a removal power and that Congress could delegate removal authority if the
executive power theory proved wrong.
Which faction of the executive power camp was right? It is hard to say. Lambert
Cadwalader, a member of the enigmatic faction, noted that the final language was
“scarcely declaratory” of the removal power “being vested in the president by the
Constitution, suggesting that he favored the earlier language precisely because he
regarded it as an express declaration in favor of the executive power theory.197 Fisher
Ames, who voted for and initially praised Benson’s second amendment,198 later claimed
that “the very best method of trying [the strength of those who opposed the executive
power theory] was blundered upon, and finally not perceived to be the best.”199 Ames
may have been right. While Benson succeeded in getting the House to adopt language
that endorsed the executive power theory, he certainly could have proposed language
that made that endorsement absolutely clear and that was wholly impervious to the
arguments made by modern revisionists.200

congressional delegation proponent, he hardly sounds like one in this letter. Instead of opposing the
executive power theory, he merely expresses a preference for certain language presumably because this
language better incorporated the executive power theory. Recall that Hartley, during the debates, admitted
that he had “some doubts” about the executive power theory, thereby suggesting that his opposition to the
second amendment was not based on complete opposition to the executive power theory.
196
Indeed, there is evidence that opponents of presidential removal regarded the deletion of the
original removal language as a “victory” of sorts. See Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (June 28,
1789), in 16 id. at 878 (“rejoic[ing] with joy unspeakable and full of security” that the president would not
have removal power).
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Letter from Lambert Cadwalader to Jame.s Monroe (July 5, 1789), in 16 id. at 946.
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See Letter from Fisher Ames to George R. Minot (July 8, 1789), in 16 id. at 979.
199
Letter from Fisher Ames to George R. Minot (July 9, 1789), in 16 id. at 985.
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In hindsight, Benson should have proposed a stand-alone resolution that merely declared the sense
of Congress that the president enjoyed a power of removal arising from his executive power. This would
have satisfied those who sought a legislative declaration on removal and would have left no doubt as to
what Congress was attempting to convey. Nonetheless, in the face of the evidence that Congress endorsed
the executive grant theory, Benson’s failure to propose such an amendment seems rather insignificant. The
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2. The Vote on the House Foreign Affairs Bill
Once the House approved Benson’s two amendments, representatives faced a
simple choice. They could vote for the bill with its implication in favor of the executive
power theory or they could vote against the bill. Faced with this choice, representatives
reverted back to their original groups. Many representatives who had voted in favor of
Benson’s second amendment now voted against the bill, for they did not wish to endorse
the executive power theory.
More importantly, those who voted against Benson’s second amendment now
voted for the House bill and thereby endorsed the executive power theory. Many of these
members, such as Boudinot and Laurance, favored the executive power theory all along.
They favored the original language either because it was a helpful declaration of
constitutional principles or because they viewed Benson’s amendment as a tacit admission
that they were wrong to fight to keep the original removal language. Others, such as
Hartley and Sedgewick, were able to vote for the House bill because they were not
implacably opposed to the executive power theory—they merely had doubts, doubts
which they apparently overcame.
Consistent with reading the House bill as an endorsement of the executive power
thesis, there was little drama when members voted on the House bill. The opponents of
the bill “knew its fate”—it would pass.201 Yet if many people who had voted to retain the
original removal language were congressional delegation partisans, as Taft’s critics have
insisted, the bill’s opponents should not have known its fate. Had there been more than a
dozen members who opposed the executive power theory and favored the congressional
delegation theory, the vote should have been quite suspenseful. With the help of the
representatives favoring the impeachment and advice and consent theories, these
supposed opponents of the executive power theory easily could have rejected the bill
resulting from Benson’s amendments. They then could have reintroduced the original
bill. This time, the executive power partisans would have known “its fate” and would not
have proposed Benson-type amendments. Because no foreign affairs crisis demanded
urgent attention, there was no pressing need for an immediate resolution of the removal

text of the Foreign Affairs bill, the debates, and contemporaneous letters suggest a clear victory for the
executive power theory. A stand-alone resolution only would have made the victory unmistakably clear.
201
11 id. at 1043. See also id. (comments of Representative Sumter that he could not let the bill “pass”
without expressing his “detestation of the principle it contains” suggesting that Sumter knew the bill would
pass as well).
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issue.202 If the congressional delegation proponents enjoyed the strength that Brandeis
and Corwin attributed to them, the representatives could have secured a bill more to
their liking.203
In fact, a member apparently made a motion to reconsider the votes on Benson’s
amendments. According to the New York Daily Advertiser, “it was contended that by
the decision of the house upon it on Monday the principles of the bill were materially
altered, and that it was important that such a subject should undergo the most thorough
canvass [sic].” 204 This motion failed, presumably because a majority was comfortable
with a bill that implicitly endorsed the executive power theory.
The opponents of the bill knew its fate because they recognized that a majority of
the House favored the executive power theory. Indeed, Madison and Benson had
claimed as much even before the vote on Benson’s amendments. The existence of an
executive power majority explains why no one could extend the debate prior to the vote
on the House bill. The existence of such a majority also explains why no one was
surprised that the House bill passed by a vote of 29 to 22.205
3. The Aftermath
Another way to gauge the meaning of the House’s vote on the Department of
Foreign Affairs bill is to examine its aftermath. Was any principle that might have been
established promptly repudiated by subsequent decisions of the House or the Senate? Did
mature reflection lead to a realization that it had been wrong for members of the
enigmatic faction to vote for the final bill because of its obvious implications? Moreover,
how did contemporaries describe the vote? Was it deemed a muddled vote for
presidential removal, without any constitutional implications because of the supposedly
divided forces behind it, as Corwin and Brandeis claimed? Or did people consider it a
vote for the executive power theory, as Taft supposed?
202

John Jay served as acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a holdover from the Articles of
Confederation period. He continued to serve in that post well after the Foreign Affairs bill was signed into
law because it took a while for Thomas Jefferson, Washington’s choice for Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to
return from Europe. Apparently, nothing changed after the enactment of the Foreign Affairs Act.
203
It seems likely that many opponents of presidential removal power had the same preferences as
Representative Tucker. Tucker’s least favorite alternative was a bill that implied a constitutional grant; and
his second least favorite alternative was a bill that delegated removal authority. 11 id. at 1034-35. If others
shared his preferences and if there more than a dozen legislative grant partisans, these legislative grant
partisans should have been able to garner a majority for its favored position by garnering the votes of those
who disliked the executive power theory the most.
204
11 id. at 1036.
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Once again, the evidence supports Taft. To begin with, subsequent “Decisions of
1789” support the view that the vote on the House bill was an endorsement of the
executive power theory. In particular, both the War and Treasury Department bills
contained the same implied endorsement of the executive power theory.
On the same day as the House vote on the Foreign Affairs bill (June 24, 1789),
Benson proposed a single amendment to the proposed War Department bill, one that
embodied his two earlier Foreign Affairs amendments.206 One opponent of the earlier bill
said that Benson’s War Department amendment was “unnecessary” because Benson
“ought to be satisfied with having had the principle established in the other bill.”207
Another opponent of the earlier bill claimed that Benson’s new amendment “argued a
doubt” about the majority’s convictions. The only reason to propose the amendment
again was because the majority believed it had to repeat its doubtful principle in the War
Department bill.208 By a vote of 24 to 22, Benson’s amendment passed, thus creating a
War Department bill that also endorsed the executive power theory.209
Though this vote was far closer than the vote on the Foreign Affairs bill, it also
constituted a vote in favor of the executive power theory. The brief discussion preceding
the vote suggested that the losing side understood that the majority had already
established the executive power principle. Had members believed that the removal
language in the Foreign Affairs bill was somehow a grant of removal authority rather than
an acknowledgement of its constitutional basis, no one would have told Benson that he
already had established a principle and no one would have regarded his War Department
amendment unnecessary.210
Parallel removal language likewise found its way into the House Treasury
Department bill.211 After the Senate deleted this language, the House refused to agree to
the Senate’s revision.212 When the Senate insisted upon its amendment,213 the chambers
206

11 id. at 1044.
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Benson likely proposed the amendment because he wanted to make it clear that Congress believed
that the executive power theory applied to the War and Treasury Departments as well. If those
departments contained the original removal provisions, such provisions might have suggested that the
Congress had a different view about removal when it came to the War and Treasury Departments. Hence,
Benson and his allies sought consistent removal text in all three of the departmental acts.
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See section 7 of the Treasury Bill found at 6 id. at 1983, 1985.
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6 id. at 1979, 1985 n. 9. Apparently, 19 Representatives voted to accept the Senate’s amendments.
6 id. at 1985 n.9.
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6 id. at 1979.
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appointed an unsuccessful conference committee.214 Apparently, the members of the
House committee made a remarkable demand upon their counterparts: the Senate is
“called upon by [the House conferees] to restore the Clause which they struck out, or by
an explicit Resolution acknowledge the Power of removal in the president.”215
Speaking for the House members of the conference committee, Madison claimed
before the House that “it would not be right for the house to” accede to the Senate’s
deletion.216 The House thereafter resolved that it “doth adhere to their [previous]
disagreement” to the Senate’s attempt to delete the removal language.217 Presumably
Madison and the House majority realized that deleting the removal language from the bill
would suggest that the president lacked a constitutional removal power over the Treasury
Secretary, especially when compared to the acknowledgements in the first two bills.
Faced with the two choices offered by the House conferees, either adopt an extra
resolution endorsing the executive power theory or recede from their amendment, the
Senate chose the latter path by a 10-10 vote, with the Vice President breaking the tie.218
Hence, when confronted with a House resolutely in favor of language that implied that
the president had a constitutional right of removal, the Senate eventually blinked and
conceded the point, albeit on yet another close vote. As with the prior two bills, it is hard
to escape the conclusion that the votes in favor of the Treasury bill were votes in favor of
the executive power theory.
Once again, private letters support Taft’s claims because they treated House and
Senate votes as vindications of the executive power theory. In numerous letters, Madison
repeatedly proclaimed that the House had endorsed the executive power theory. For
instance, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Madison wrote that the House decided that the
president had a removal power arising out of the executive power on the grounds that this
was “most consonant to the text of the Constitution, to the policy of mixing the
Legislative and Executive departments as little as possible, and to the requisite
responsibility and harmony in the Executive Department.”219 Richard Bland Lee wrote
that it “was determined in the affirmative” that the president “had, or ought to have, from
214

6 id. at 1979 & n. 7.
See Letter of Thomas Hartley to William Irvine (Aug. 17, 1789), in 16 id. at 1337; see also Letter
from Thomas Hartley to Jasper Yeates (Aug. 16, 1789), in 16 id. at 1332. The Congressional Register
reported that Madison claimed that the House conferees had “submitted certain propositions” to the Senate
conferees. 11 id. at 1324. Apparently, among those propositions was an executive power ultimatum.
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11 id. at 1324.
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3 id. at 167.
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See 11 id. at 1979-80.
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See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 16 id. at 893; See also Letter
from James Madison to Tench Coxe (June 24, 1789), in 16 id. at 853 (saying same); Letter from James
Madison to George Nicholas (July 5, 1789), in 16 id. at 954-56 (same).
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a fair Construction of the constitution,” a removal power.220 In discussing the troubled
Treasury bill, Thomas Fitzsimmons, who voted against Benson’s second amendment but
for the House Foreign Affairs bill, claimed that the disagreement turned on the
“Constitutional power of the president to remove.”221
The Senate’s vote to retain the House’s removal language was likewise seen as a
vindication of the executive power position. Senator Paine Wingate, who voted to strip
out the removal language in the Foreign Affairs bill, described the Senate’s vote to retain
the House’s removal language as turning on the point “whether the president had a
constitutional right to remove; and not on the expediency of it.”222 Likewise,
Representative William Smith of Maryland described the Senate’s vote as favoring the
president’s “right of removal from office as chief Majistrate [sic].”223 Similarly, the
Massachusetts Sentinel printed a post from New York that the “president of the Senate
gave the casting vote in favour of the clause as it came from the House, by which the
power of the president, to remove from office (as contained in the Constitution) is
recognized.”224 The Vice-president himself complained that his “Vote for the presidents
Power of Removal, according to the Constitution, has raised from Hell an host of political
and poetical devils.”225
Each of these letters reveals that the removal language was generally understood
to endorse the “constru[c]tion of the Constitution, which vests the power of removal in
the president.”226 Each of the acts, by discussing what would happen upon the president’s
removal of a secretary, clearly implied that the president had a constitutional power of
removal.
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See Letter from Richard Bland Lee to Leven Powell (June 27, 1789), in 16 id. at 866-67.
Letter from Thomas Fitzsimmons to Samuel Meredith (Aug. 24, 1789), in 16 id. at 1390.
222
Letter from Paine Wingate to Nathaniel P. Sargeant (July 18, 1789), in 16 id. at 1069. Richard
Henry Lee, who also voted against the bill in the Senate, wrote to Samuel Adams that “it is an erroneous
construction of the constitution to suppose it gives the Presidents a right of removal at pleasure.” Letter
from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (Aug. 15, 1789), in 16 id. at 1320, 1321. Although Lee does not
explicitly claim to be discussing any of the departmental bills, it seems fair to say that he was not speaking of
the executive power theory in the abstract. He likely was condemning the fact that the bills endorsed the
theory. See also Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 27, 1789), in 17 id. at 1625
(claiming that those favoring the bills contended that “the Constitution gave the power”). Apparently,
Samuel Adams agreed with Lee. See Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Aug. 29, 1789), in
16 id. at 1418 (complaining that it was unnecessary to say anything about removal if Constitution actually
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endorsing the executive power theory).
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16 id. at 1077.
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Finally, one cannot ignore the fact that subsequent presidents clearly believed that
they had the power to remove officers by virtue of the Constitution itself. Washington
removed twenty-three officers, Adams twenty-seven, and Jefferson one-hundred and
twenty four.227 These presidents apparently did not cite the Decision of 1789 as the basis
for these removals, so it is possible that each of them came to the conclusion that they
had a constitutional removal power independent of the Decision of 1789. Nonetheless, it
is also the case that no one apparently challenged the president’s removals even though
no statute authorized (or could be read to authorize) such removals. People of the era
either believed that the Constitution authorized presidential removals or, if they doubted
the executive power theory, at least thought that Congress had settled the question in the
first three departmental acts.
*

*

*

The three departmental bills endorsed, albeit implicitly, the executive power
theory. That was what the language was meant to accomplish and, judging by what was
said in Congress and what was written in private letters and newspapers, that was what
the removal language was understood to accomplish. Although Brandeis and Corwin
have contested the claim that the language endorsed the executive power theory, they
have never really offered an alternative explanation of the bills’ texts, preferring instead
to focus on the votes of the enigmatic faction.
Explaining the votes of the enigmatic faction is rather simple. Some thought that
the original bill language was an explicit (and therefore superior) congressional
declaration of the Constitution’s meaning. Others were surprised by Benson’s
amendments and voted against the second amendment because they did not want to
concede ground that they had fiercely fought to retain. Reversing field on a moment’s
notice requires a nimbleness that most people lack. Still others could hear the glee in the
opposition’s voices and did not want to vote in a manner that seemed an admission of
defeat to the other side.
Can we say with certainty that all members of the enigmatic faction believed
wholeheartedly in the executive power theory? Of course not. But it seems likely that all
of them felt comfortable with the executive power theory, comfortable enough that each
of them had no difficulty voting for three bills that clearly endorsed it. Indeed, when the
Senate repeatedly tested the House’s executive power majority in the context of the
Treasury bill, the House stood its ground and issued an ultimatum: retain the removal
227
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language or pass a stand alone resolution affirming the executive power theory. When
presented with an obvious opportunity to reconsider or repudiate the Decision of 1789, a
sufficient number of the enigmatic faction obviously voted to affirm the Decision of 1789.
Faced with a resolute House, the Senate blinked and reinstated the removal language
that implied a constitutional power of removal.
III. DECIPHERING THE DECISION OF 1789
So there was a Decision of 1789, a decision about the president’s executive power
under the Constitution. After a great deal of sophisticated debate, Congress decided that
the president had a constitutional right to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
Congress made the same decisions with respect to the Secretaries of War and Treasury,
though not without further controversy. In sum, Congress held that the Constitution
granted the president the power to remove secretaries of the executive departments.
But to describe the Decision in this way is to adopt the narrowest reading of the
Decision. Given the length of the debates and the number of votes, it is possible that the
Decision resolved other questions. This part considers what else the Decision might have
decided. Did the Decision also address other types of officers? In particular, what about
other types of executive officers, such as inferior executive officers? What about nonexecutive officers? Moreover, did Congress believe that the president had an indefeasible
executive power of removal or did Congress leave open the possibility that Congress
might constrain or even eliminate the president’s removal authority? Finally, did
members of Congress believe that their decision would “settle” the question of removal, in
much the way a court case might finally settle a dispute between two parties?
Answering these questions with any certainty is impossible. Notwithstanding the
uncertainty, it seems appropriate to discuss these issues precisely because so much has
been said (and continues to be said) about what the Decision did and did not decide.

A.

The Removal of Executive Officers
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Some have suggested that the Decision only related to “high political office,” such
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.228 In other words, Congress said little or nothing about
whether the Constitution permitted the president to remove other non-inferior executive
officers, such as the early Attorney General.229 Justice Story made the more limited claim
that the Decision did not relate to inferior offices. Because Congress could decide who
could unilaterally appoint inferior officers, it also could decide who could remove these
officers.230
At one level, the debate was about the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, War, and
Treasury. There was little discussion of officers that might be inferior officers, such as
collectors, surveyors, and the postmasters and there was little discussion of non-inferior
officers like ambassadors.
Yet the Decision’s ratio decendi was that the president had a removal power by
virtue of the executive power clause. As Madison put it, “if any power whatsoever is in its
nature executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who
execute the laws.” And this logic applied equally well to officers meant to carry the
president’s foreign policies into execution, such as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and
the nation’s envoys. After all, Madison (and others) made all their removal arguments in
the course of the debate over the Foreign Affairs Act. Because removal of executive
officers was an executive power and because the Constitution did not constrain or abridge
removal authority (as it had appointment authority), the president could remove all
executive officers unilaterally.231
Indeed the debates reflected the understanding that the President could remove
all executive officers. Madison noted that if the president had removal power “the chain
of dependence is this—The officer of the lowest grade, the officer of the middle and
higher grades, will be dependent on the president.” The dependence of all executive
officers on the president followed precisely the president could remove all of them. Each
of them was dependent on the president directly. Similarly, Representative Samuel
Livermore of New Hampshire attempted to make hay of the fact that the majority’s
arguments made all executive officers, such ambassadors and military officers, subject to
228

Corwin, supra note 13, at 338 (the decision “related to a high political office, to an office created to
be organ of the President”).
229
The early Attorney General was not a department head. Nor was he an inferior officer. See
Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, __ Geo. Wash. L. Rev. __ (2005) (forthcoming).
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2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1544.
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The Decision properly applies to all executive officers, however appointed. Hence, if we assume
that cross-branch appointments are constitutional, the president should be able to remove executive officers
appointed by judges. Inferior executive officers, however appointed, assist the president employ his
executive power.
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presidential removal.232 Livermore thought this showed the absurdity of the majority’s
position. Apparently, no one in the majority bothered to refute Livermore’s claim
because they agreed with his assessment that the executive power argument applied to all
executive officers.
Had the majority believed that the president’s authority arose from his power to
appoint, perhaps Story’s argument would have traction. Because Congress could decide
who would appoint inferior officers, perhaps it could also allocate the power to remove as
it saw fit. But the majority did not endorse the executive appointment argument. They
endorsed the idea that the president had removal authority by virtue of the grant of
executive power. Representatives only made arguments about appointment to show that
even on the premises of the advice and consent partisans, the president had a
constitutional right to remove, at least as to superior officers.233 If one believed that
whoever appointed an officer could remove her as well, the president was the one who
actually appointed, albeit with the Senate’s consent. Hence executive power proponents
claimed that the appointment argument made by advice and consent proponents actually
favored unilateral presidential removal.234
In any event, the appointment arguments made by some executive power
proponents do not diminish the many instances in which representatives invoked the
executive power theory. People concluded that the Chief Magistrate—so titled because
of his executive power—could remove executive officers. First, the grant of executive
power included a power to remove. Second, it seemed inconceivable that the
Constitution would make the president the Chief Magistrate and hold him responsible for
the conduct of the executive branch and yet convey him no power to remove executive
officers. To paraphrase Madison, the removal power was the sine qua non of a Chief
Executive empowered with the executive power.

232

1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 365 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1789).
What members of the majority coalition said is if one thought that appointment was crucial in
determining who had removal authority, they believed that the president actually appointed. The Senate
could prevent an appointment from taking place, but they had no role in the actual act of appointing. See
e.g., 11 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, supra note 24, at 871 (comments of John
Vining); 11 id. at 903 (comments of Egbert Benson).
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The Removal of Non-Executive Officers

The Decision of 1789 related to removal of executive officers for the simple reason
that the three secretaries were understood by most to be executive officers. The Congress
concluded that the president could remove executive officers because such officers
carried into execution the president’s executive powers.
A colloquy conducted within days of the Decision of 1789 suggests that the
Decision did not reach the president’s power to remove non-executive officers. While
discussing the Treasury Act, James Madison argued that the Comptroller ought to have a
greater permanency in office,235 because the Comptroller would partake of both executive
and judicial qualities.236 The Comptroller would have judicial features because he would
decide claims brought by citizens against the United States.237 Despite the Comptroller’s
judicial features, Madison argued that the Comptroller should be responsible to both
Congress and the president and proposed that the Comptroller serve a set number of
years, “unless sooner removed by the president.”238
Madison’s proposal baffled his colleagues. If Madison hoped to make the
Comptroller independent of the president, why had he implied that the president had a
constitutional power to remove the Comptroller? Like the Foreign Affairs and War Acts,
Madison’s language assumed a removal power and did not convey one. Moreover, by
giving the Comptroller a set term, the Comptroller would have to be reconfirmed at the
end of his term, making him more dependent upon Congress.
Madison’s former allies criticized him. Sedgwick claimed that the Comptroller
would be an executive officer. He implied that because the Comptroller was an executive
officer, the president ought to remove.239 Benson said that the House had already decided
that all non-judicial officers held tenure at the pleasure of the president.240
Madison denied Benson’s claim that the president could remove all officers other
than judges.241 Madison claimed that the earlier decision only related to purely executive
officers, whereas the Comptroller was partly executive and partly judicial.242 When it
235
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came to offices with this judicial character, Congress could modify the officer’s tenure,
Madison claimed.243
The next day, Madison withdrew his motion.244 Because Madison never explained
his withdrawal, we do not know his reasons.245 Perhaps he realized that his proposal was
at odds with his comments about the judicial nature of the comptroller. Perhaps he
believed that he could not get majority support for his proposal. Or perhaps he came to
the conclusion, as his erstwhile allies had, that he was wrong.
Despite the equivocal nature of this episode, it suggests that the Decision of 1789
did not encompass a conclusion that a president had a power to remove all officers of the
United States that lacked constitutionally-granted tenure during good behavior. The
original decision had focused on officers that were obviously executive. There was no
discussion of what the constitutional rule was with respect to officers who could not (or
should not) be classified as purely executive. Though we cannot say how many members
of the majority would have sided with Madison as opposed to Benson, there seems little
doubt that there was a split, at least temporarily. Given the division on Madison’s
withdrawn motion, it is impossible to say that the Decision decided the fate of officers
who are neither Article III judges nor executive officers.246
C.

The Possibility of a Defeasible Removal Power

The majority believed that the Constitution granted the president a power to
remove executive officers. Hence the Acts were written to convey the impression that
Congress believed that the president already enjoyed a power to remove. But did the
majority also decide that this removal power was beyond the reach of congressional
regulation? Could Congress, by statute, limit or eliminate the Constitution’s grant of
removal authority? Brandeis, McReynolds, and Corwin insisted that the Decision of 1789
left open the possibility that Congress might modify or abridge the president’s
constitutional power of removal.247
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See Myers, 272 U.S. 52, 194-95 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); Myers, 272 U.S. 52, 283-84 (Brandeis,
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Although the better view is that the president’s constitutional powers are not
default powers that Congress may limit or eliminate, the reading of the Decision of 1789
advanced by Taft’s critics seems right. Because the question of a default removal power
was never squarely joined, it is hard to conclude that a majority of the House implicitly
opposed the idea of a default removal power. Although Madison claimed that the
president’s constitutional powers were “unabateable” and that Congress could not extend
the constitution’s exceptions to the executive power, his claims were never really debated.
248
Because Madison’s opposition refused to concede that the removal power was an
executive power, they had no occasion to address whether the removal power was an
executive power that Congress could modify or abridge by statute.
To be sure, there were many representatives who sought a public repudiation of
the congressional delegation theory. This was Benson and Madison’s stated aim.249 They
were afraid that the congressional delegation theory permitted Congress to modify or
abridge the president’s removal power and that Congress might decide not to grant a
removal power at all.250 But repudiating the congressional delegation theory is not the
same thing as repudiating a default removal power. One could conclude that the
Constitution granted the president a removal power and that Congress lacked authority
to delegate a removal power, and yet still believe that, by statute, Congress might limit or
retract the Constitution’s grant of removal authority.
Because the logic of the executive power partisans did not necessarily preclude the
idea of a default power and because there was neither much discussion of the idea nor a
decisive vote against it, the Decision of 1789 did not endorse the view that Congress
lacked authority to modify the Constitution’s grant of removal power to the president.
While there are plenty of sound reasons to doubt the idea that Congress has some generic
power to treat constitutional grants of power as grants that Congress can modify or
abridge, the Decision of 1789 is not one of them.
D.

The Legitimacy and Effect of the Decision of 1789

Throughout the debates, some opponents of the removal language argued that it
was inappropriate for Congress to declare its view of the Constitution’s meaning. Some
feared that Congress would regularly decide the Constitution’s meaning and would
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thereby usurp the judiciary’s role as ultimate arbiter of the Constitution’s meaning.251
Others feared that in “construing” the Constitution, Congress would amend it and
thereby expand Congress’ powers.252 Congress should adopt the policy of saying nothing
about the Constitution. If executive power partisans were right, the president would
remove and the courts could decide the question.253 There was no need for a legislative
declaration of the Constitution’s meaning.
Obviously, a majority of the House refused to accept the notion that the courts
enjoyed a monopoly on constitutional interpretation.254 All branches had the power to
say what the Constitution meant. While the judges might decide the Constitution’s
meaning, once and for all, other institutions could have their say too.255
Some members of the majority went further, arguing that the courts had no
superior power to establish the Constitution’s meaning. Madison, in particular, denied
that the courts had some special role:
I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of government, that
the exposition of the laws and Constitution devolves upon
the judicial; but I beg to know upon what principle it can
he contended that any one department draws from the
Constitution greater powers than another, in marking out
the limits of the powers of the several departments. The
Constitution is the charter of the people in the
government; it specifies certain great powers as absolutely
granted, and marks out the departments to exercise them.
If the constitutional boundary of either be brought into
question, I do not see that any one of these independent
departments has more right than another to declare their
sentiments on that point.256
Madison seemed to suggest that expressing the constitutional readings of Congress was
useful precisely because courts had no unique authority to decide the Constitution’s
251
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meaning. Since no branch enjoyed interpretive supremacy,257 each ought to voice its
opinion on the Constitution’s meaning.
A few members of the majority doubted that the question of removal could even
be heard by the courts.258 If the president removed an officer, a court might not be able to
hear the case because the president was probably not subject to civil process. That being
the case, a congressional decision on the locus of removal power would be the last word
for all intents and purposes. Indeed, Madison, somewhat cryptically, suggested that the
“decision . . . made will become the permanent exposition of the constitution.”259
All representatives must have recognized that being first to express a judgment
about the Constitution’s meaning relating to removal certainly had its advantages. Some,
sensing that they would ultimately triumph, undoubtedly wanted to claim that it might be
entrenched somehow. Others, sensing that they would lose, argued that the Congress
ought to say nothing that might serve as a precedent for posterity. But these were the
arguments of the extremes. The vast majority of representatives understood that
Congress could express its views about the Constitution’s meaning and that while the
Decision would be entitled to some deference it would not decide the question of removal
for all time.
Anyone reading the debates of the Decision of 1789 comes away knowing that the
departmentalist theory has very deep and solid roots.260 Although many acknowledged
that judges would have a chance to register their views about removal, very few thought
that the judiciary had a monopoly on constitutional interpretation. Specifically, a
majority of the House and Senate clearly had no qualms about expressing their views
about the Constitution’s meaning.
IV. CONCLUSION
Before there was Brown, before there was Dred Scott, before there was Marbury,
there was the Decision of 1789. While creating the three great executive departments,
Congress approved three acts, each of which clearly assumed that the Constitution
257

For an argument against interpretive supremacy, see Saikrishna Prakash and John Yoo, Against
Interpretive Supremacy, __ MICH. L. REV. __ (2005) (forthcoming).
258
See 11 id. at 946 (comments of Theodore Sedgewick) (doubting that president could be compelled
to answer in a civil suit and doubting that president could be mandamused). But see 11 id. at 936
(comments of William Smith of South Carolina) (declaring that where there is a right to an office there is a
damage remedy). Smith’s comments echo what Chief Justice Marshall would say in Marbury v. Madison.
259
11 id. at 921. See also 11. id. 996 (comments of Abraham Baldwin) (claiming that judiciary will
“consider themselves obliged by our decision”).
260
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

2005

New Light on the Decision of 1789

49

granted the president a removal authority. Members who voted for the three bills knew
full well that they were endorsing the view that the president had a right to remove these
officers by virtue of the executive power. All members understood that the removal
decisions of Congress were exceedingly important. As one member said during the
debate, “the day on which this [removal] question will be decided, will be a memorable
day, not only in the history of our own times, but in the history of mankind; that on a
proper or improper decision will be involved the future misery or happiness of the people
of America.”261 He can be charged with only a slight exaggeration.
Contrary to the views of some, the majority in favor of the three House bills was
not split between congressional delegation and executive power partisans. Instead, prior
to the vote on Benson’s second amendment, the executive power majority was split
between two factions, one of which favored Benson’s language that implied a
constitutional removal power and one of which favored a more forceful congressional
declaration of the executive power theory. This was a tactical split and not a division
grounded in differences in constitutional principle. Once the House adopted Benson’s
second amendment, the factions closed ranks and pushed through three bills. When it
comes to whether the Constitution grants the president a removal power, the Decision of
1789 was not a “Non-Decision.”
At a time when some scholars search for means of ensuring that members of
Congress take their constitutional responsibilities more seriously and as others argue that
the political branches ought to take a dominant role in constitutional interpretation, the
Decision of 1789 beckons like a beacon, inviting us to gaze in admiration at an episode
when Congress approached its constitutional duties with deliberation, sincerity, and
sophistication second to none.

261

11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 962 (comments of
Richard Bland Lee).

Appendix I
Crucial House Votes During the Decision of 1789
Last Name
Ames
Baldwin
Benson
Boudinot
Brown
Burke
Cadwalader
Carroll
Clymer
Coles
Contee
Fitzsimmons
Gerry
Gilman
Goodhue
Griffin
Grout
Hartley
Hathorn
Heister
Huntington
Lawrance
Lee
Leonard
Livermore
Madison, Jr.
Mathews
Moore
Muhlenberg
Page
Parker
Partridge
Schuerman
Scott
Sedgwick
Seney
Sherman
Silvester
Sinnickson
Smith (MD)
Smith (SC)

First Name
Fisher
Abraham
Egbert
Elias
John
Edanus
Lambert
Daniel
George
Isaac
Benjamin
Thomas
Elbridge
Nicolas
Benjamin
Samuel
Jonathan
Thomas
John
Daniel
Benjamin
John
Richard Bland
George
Samuel
James
George
Andrew
Peter
John
Josiah
George
James
Thomas
Theodore
Joshua
Roger
Peter
Thomas
William
William

Amendment 1
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N

Amendment 2
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y

“Amendment 1” refers to the June 22nd vote on Egbert Benson’s first amendment.
“Amendment 2” refers to the June 22nd vote on Egbert Benson’s second amendment.
“House bill” refers to the June 24th vote on the House Foreign Affairs Bill.

House Bill
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N

Crucial House Votes During the Decision of 1789
Last Name
Stone
Thatcher
Trumbell
Tucker
Van Rensselaer
Vining
Wadsworth
White

First Name
Michael Jenifer
George
Jonathan
Thomas Tudor
Jeremiah
John
Jeremiah
Alexander

Amendment 1

Amendment 2

Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N

N
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y

“Amendment 1” refers to the June 22nd vote on Egbert Benson’s first amendment.
“Amendment 2” refers to the June 22nd vote on Egbert Benson’s second amendment.
“House bill” refers to the June 24th vote on the House Foreign Affairs Bill.

House Bill
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
N

